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Although many previous studies have shown that eye-like images promote 
generosity, the mechanism of this “watching eyes effect” remains unclear. One possible 
cause is the concern for a good reputation as a generous person, while the other is the 
concerns for a bad reputation as a norm violator. To elucidate which of these two concerns 
is the main influencer, the present study conducted a laboratory experiment that 
investigated whether the watching eyes effect changed depending on social norms. If the 
concern for a good reputation leads to the effect, prosocial behavior would be more likely 
in the presence of watching eyes, regardless of the social norms involved. However, if the 
concern for avoiding a bad reputation as a norm violator leads to the effect, watching eyes 
promote prosocial behavior only in the existence of prosocial norms. In the original study, 
participants were asked to make a donation under conditions in which eye-like images 
either were or were not present. In addition to the eye-like images, we manipulated 
prosocial norms by informing each participant of either high or low mean donation 
amounts given by previous participants. We found that watching eyes promoted donations 
only when a prosocial norm existed. This supports the idea that the watching eyes effect 
is caused by a concern for avoiding a bad reputation from violating norms. However, in 
a replication study, we were unable to replicate the original results; watching eyes did not 
promote generosity regardless of the norm. Taken together, we discussed the moderation 
effect of norms and the possibility of other moderators. 
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1.  Introduction 
Previous studies have repeatedly examined whether individuals become 
generous when they are “watched” by eye-like images (e.g., Haley and Fessler, 2005; 
Nettle et al., 2013; Sparks and Barclay, 2013). For example, Haley and Fessler (2005) 
demonstrated that participants who were shown eye-like images distributed more of their 
money to strangers than did participants who were not shown the images. In addition, 
Ernest-Jones, Nettle, and Bateson (2011) found that when the experimenter put a poster 
of eyes in a real-world cafeteria situation, littering decreased. Such a “watching eyes 
effect” has been observed in both laboratory settings (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Nettle et 
al., 2013; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, and Kitayama, 2009; Sparks and Barclay, 2013) and out 
in the field (Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts, 2006; Ernest-Jones et al., 2011; Powell, Roberts, 
and Nettle, 2012). 
 
While many studies have found the watching eyes effect, some studies did not 
replicate the effect (e.g., Matsugasaki, Tsukamoto, and Ohtsubo, 2015; Raihani and 
Bshary, 2012; Tane and Takezawa, 2011). Further, recently Northover, Pedersen, Cohen, 
and Andrews (2017) conducted meta analyses about the watching eyes effect and reported 
that watching eyes did not promote generosity across a wide range of situations. One 
plausible reason the results are mixed is that there are other factors that moderate the 
effect. Therefore, it is important to consider when and why the watching eyes promote 
generosity. 
 
Why do eye-like images promote generosity? Concerning one possibility, 
researchers have argued that because pictorial eyes activate reputational concern, they 
promote prosocial behavior (e.g., Haley and Fessler, 2005). It is known that we are likely 
to choose a partner with whom to interact and cooperate, based on that individual’s 
reputation (e.g., Sylwester and Roberts, 2013). Consequently, a person with a good 
reputation receives social benefits, whereas a person with a bad reputation receives 
negative sanctions such as punishment or ostracism. Therefore, it is important to maintain 
one’s reputations of being a generous person. More importantly, some researchers have 
considered that people are so sensitive to reputation that not only real observers, but also 
eye-like images—in other words, subtle perception cues of “others”—can activate 
reputational concerns. Komiya, Oishi, and Lee (2016) conducted a cognitive experiment 
in which participants classified a string of letters into words or non-words as accurately 
and quickly as possible. The results showed that the participants reacted faster to 
reputational words (e.g., reputation, outcast, and rumor) in a condition consisting of eyes 
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being presented during the task than in one in which there were no eyes present. These 
findings suggest that people activate concerns about their reputations when they are being 
“watched” by mere pictorial representations of eyes. 
 
Reputational concern can be divided into two components: seeking a good 
reputation and avoiding a bad one. Which concern is more important in inducing the 
watching eyes effect? On the one hand, a body of research argues that the concern for a 
good reputation leads to prosocial behaviors, because people with good reputations would 
receive social benefits, such as good interaction partners in the future (e.g., Barclay and 
Willer, 2007). In support of this idea, some studies have shown that the expectation of 
social rewards, rather than the avoidance of punishment, promoted prosocial behavior in 
the presence of pictorial eyes (Oda, Niwa, Honma, and Hiraishi, 2011; Powell et al., 2012). 
Indeed, Oda et al. (2011) asked their participants to answer a post-task questionnaire 
concerning their thoughts during a money distribution task. They found that the watching 
eyes effect was mediated by expectations of future rewards; that is, individuals expected 
future rewards in the presence of watching eyes, and they were more likely than those 
who were not presented with eyes to behave in a prosocial manner. We refer to this 
explanation as the seeking a good reputation hypothesis. 
 
On the other hand, people sometimes behave generously to avoid a bad 
reputation and the threat of future punishment (e.g., Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and 
Villeval, 2003). In a situation in which generosity is normative, those who do not behave 
in a prosocial manner are judged as “atypical people” who violate social norms. 
Consequently, they get a bad reputation and become the target of negative sanctions such 
as punishment or ostracism (e.g., Chudek and Henrich, 2011). Some studies have argued 
that the concern for avoiding a bad reputation is responsible for the watching eyes effect. 
Nettle et al. (2013) showed that money distribution variance becomes smaller (i.e., there 
are fewer extremely high or low outlying values) in front of eyes. This suggests that 
participants conform to local norms to avoid a bad reputation, rather than becoming 
equally generous. Some additional findings fit the avoiding a bad reputation hypothesis 
(e.g., Bateson et al., 2006; Ernest-Jones et al., 2011; Oda, Kato, and Hiraishi, 2015). For 
example, Bateson et al. (2006) put pictorial eyes on an honesty box in an office, and found 
that in front of eyes people were more likely to pay for their drinks. If others saw that 
they did not pay for their drinks, they would be thought of as people who did not follow 
local rules and would be charged accordingly. Therefore, this paying for their drinks when 




To test these two alternative hypotheses, the present study focused on social 
norms of generosity. In a situation in which prosocial behavior is not the social norm, not 
being generous is no longer non-normative; that is, a non-generous person would not be 
seen as a norm violator. Then, from the perspective of avoiding a bad reputation for norm 
violation, an individual would not behave generously, even when there are eyes watching. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of gaining a good reputation for prosocial 
behavior, acting in a prosocial manner always leads to a good reputation; thus, being 
watched by eyes would induce prosocial behaviors regardless of the presence of prosocial 
norms. 
 
Two studies have already examined whether manipulating the norms of 
generosity influences the watching eyes effect (Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond 
Roche, and Nettle, 2013; Fathi, Bateson, and Nettle, 2014). For example, Bateson et al. 
(2013) investigated whether littering decreased in the presence of watching eyes, or 
according to the amount of litter present on the ground. If the watching eyes effect is 
caused by the concern for avoiding a bad reputation, eyes would inhibit littering only 
when the ground was clean. The results showed, however, that regardless of the litter on 
the ground, eyes decreased littering behavior. Thus, their results provide support for the 
seeking a good reputation hypothesis. 
 
Although it is important to investigate these effects in real-world settings, many 
other factors, such as the level of anonymity, could have confounded with Bateson et al.’s 
(2013) manipulations. To eliminate these confounding factors, Fathi et al. (2014) 
conducted a donation experiment manipulating norms and eyes in a laboratory setting. 
They brought participants to a cubicle featuring a poster with or without eyes. At the end 
of the experiment, they asked the participants whether they would donate something to a 
local organization by putting a charity collection jar on the desk. As a manipulation of a 
prosocial norm, they manipulated the amount of money the participants could see in the 
charity jar. The majority of the coins in the jar were worth 1 or 2 £ in the large-norm 
condition and 10 or 20 pence in the small-norm condition. Their results found a main 
effect of eyes, thus supporting the seeking a good reputation hypothesis. 
 
Although these studies are well-designed experiments, we should note one 
common limitation: it is likely their norm manipulation was weak. Although Bateson et 
al. (2013) manipulated the norm about littering, the norm of no-littering is generally 
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shared; it is likely that their manipulation of norm was not strong enough to override the 
existing norm. In relation to Fathi et al. (2014), the per capita donation amount could not 
be determined. Although the types of coins in the jar somewhat reflected whether others 
donated more or less, the normative behavior was unclear. Indeed, in reference to 
donation amount, there was no difference between the large-norm and small-norm 
conditions. Therefore, it is crucial to re-examine whether the watching eyes effect on 
generosity is dependent upon social norms by manipulating norms in such a way that 
participants can clearly understand what is normative. 
 
In the present study, we examined whether the watching eyes effect depends on 
social norms. Unlike Fathi et al.’s (2014) study, we directly presented the mean amount 
of others’ donations to clarify the social norm. Considering the fact that previous studies 
also presented the mean amount of others’ donations as norm information (Nook, Ong, 
Morelli, Mitchell, and Zaki, 2016; Shang and Croson, 2009), it is reasonable to use the 
mean amount of others’ donations as norm information. By manipulating the eyes and 
norms, we examined the seeking good reputation and avoiding bad reputation hypotheses 
as both null and alternative hypotheses. We considered that if the watching eyes effect is 
caused by the concern for a good reputation, the watching eyes would promote donations 
regardless of the social norms. On the other hand, if the watching eyes effect is caused by 
the concern for avoiding a bad reputation, watching eyes would promote donations only 
in the presence of a prosocial norm. 
 
2.  Original Study 
2.1.  Methods 
2.1.1. Participants and design 
 One hundred thirty-nine Japanese university students aged 18-32 years (M = 20.8, 
SD = 1.96; 80 males and 59 females) were paid 1000 JPY to participate (120 JPY = 
approximately 1 USD). They were randomly allocated to one condition of a 2 (eyes: eyes 
vs. no eyes) × 2 (norm: prosocial vs. non-prosocial) between-participants design: (a) 
prosocial norm with eyes (n = 35), (b) prosocial norm without eyes (n = 35), (c) non-
prosocial norm with eyes (n = 35), and (d) non-prosocial norm without eyes (n = 34). The 
participant sex ratio was almost equal throughout all conditions. This study was approved 
by the ethics committee at the Graduate School of Education of Kyoto University, and 





Under the cover story that the experiment was conducted to investigate 
individual differences in cognitive activity, university students participated in the 
experiment. Before they arrived at the laboratory, the participants completed an online 
survey that included demographic questions and some questionnaires. Participants 
answered the Praise Seeking and Rejection Avoidance Questionnaire (Kojima, Ohta, and 
Sugawara, 2003), the Japanese version of the Social Phobia Scale (Kanai et al., 2004) and 
the Japanese version of the Ten Item Personality Inventory (Oshio, Abe, and Cutrone, 
2012), the Animism Scale for Adults (Ikeuchi, 2010). Because we administered these 
questionnaires for exploratory purposes, we do not discuss them further. At the end of the 
survey, they were randomly assigned an identification number. Upon their arrival at the 
laboratory, the participants were seated with an experimenter in a small room in front of 
a computer. They were first told their responses were completely anonymous because the 
ID numbers were used to manage the data. They were then given brief instructions for 
completing the experiment. After this, the experimenter left of the room to ensure the 
participants’ anonymity. All tasks were carried out using a computer program written 
inPsychoPy. During the tasks, the desktop background featured the eye-like images 
(Haley and Fessler, 2005). In the beginning, however, the program window covered the 
desktop screen so participants were not able to view the eye-like images (Fig. 1A). 
 
When they were left alone, the participants entered their identification numbers 
into a pop-up window. Then, they performed two filler tasks on the computer: the 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Cognition Inventory (Kobori and Tanno, 2004) and the 
Alternative Uses Task (provide alternative uses of pencil and of clothespins; see Vohs, 
Redden, and Rahinel, 2013). These tasks were conducted to acclimatize the participants 
to the experimental environment and were not related to the main task. 
 
After they completed the filler tasks, the participants were asked to donate less 
than half of their participation fee to the Japanese Red Cross Society (0-500 JPY; in units 
of 10 JPY). At that time, they saw an amount of money that ostensibly represented the 
mean donation of the previous eight participants. In the prosocial norm condition, the 
participants were informed that the previous eight participants donated 438 JPY on 
average. In the non-prosocial norm condition, the participants were informed that they 
donated only 38 JPY. At the same time, the size of the program window was altered to 
manipulate the eyes. In the eyes condition, the size of the program window was altered 
to reveal the eye-like images (Fig. 1B), whereas in the no eyes condition the size of the 




The participants first entered their donation amount in the pop-up window. Next, 
they took a brown envelope containing their participation fee from a drawer, and then 
they put their donation into the white envelope. The participation fee consisted of five 10-
yen coins, one 50-yen coin, four 100-yen coins and one 500-yen coin. After they finished 
the donation task, participants responded to questions concerning how much they thought 
the other participants had donated on average (0 to 500 JPY; in units of 50 JPY), their 
perception of anonymity (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), and any potential inferences 
regarding the purpose of the experiment. They then called the experimenter and let him 
know they were finished with the tasks. After the debriefing, they answered some 
questions, including a question about their beliefs concerning the reality of the normative 
cues. 
 
2.2.  Results 
 Six of the 139 participants entered different donation amounts on the PC than 
they donated in the real-world laboratory setting. Data from these participants were 
excluded from the following analyses. 
 
 The norm manipulation was successful; the participants in the prosocial norm 
condition thought that the other participants donated more than did those in the non-
prosocial norm condition (Mprosocial = 302.90, SDprosocial = 103.57, Mnon-prosocial = 55.47, 
SDnon-prosocial = 29.70; t (79.92) = 19.02, p < .001, d = 3.20). After the debriefing, 35 
participants mentioned their doubts concerning the reality of the norm manipulation. 
However, because we asked them questions concerning their beliefs in the reality of the 
norm information when we had already explained that the donation amounts of others 
were not real, this explanation could have affected their answers. Then, we focused on 
the perceptions of the donations of others, which we asked about before the debriefing. 
We found that, even among these participants, the perceptions of the donations of others 
were higher in the prosocial than the non-prosocial norm condition (Mprosocial = 269.64, 
SDprosocial = 117.33; Mnon-prosocial = 28.57, SDnon-prosocial = 26.73). Therefore, the results of 
these participants were included in the later analyses (even if we were to exclude these 
participants, we would have found the same main results). As for the anonymity rating, 
there was no significant effect of eye condition (Meyes = 5.79, SDeyes = 1.68, Mnoeyes = 5.88, 
SDnoeyes = 1.21; t (118.25) = 0.36, p = .716, d = 0.06). 
 
Across conditions, 76 of the 133 participants donated something. The mean 
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donation amount was 108.50 JPY (SD = 158.22) out of 500 JPY. Fig. 2 shows the boxplot 
of the donation amount for each condition.  
 
 Since the donation distribution was crowded with units of 100 JPY, we 
divided the donation amount into six categories (0: 0 JPY, 1: 1-100 JPY, 2: 101-200 
JPY, 3: 201-300 JPY, 4: 301-400 JPY, 5: 401-500 JPY). In further analysis, we used this 
categorical variable as the indicator of the donation amount. We conducted proportional 
odds ordinal logistic regression analyses for the donation amount (Table 1). In Model 1, 
we put control (dummy variable of sex) and predictor (dummy variables of eyes and 
norms) variables into the regression. As shown in Table 1, we found a significant effect 
of norm condition and a marginally non-significant effect of eye condition. There was 
no significant effect of sex. We added the interaction term between eyes and norms in 
Model 2 and found that this interaction effect was significant. To investigate the effects 
of eyes per norm condition, we conducted simple slope analyses. The results of these 
analyses showed that when there was a non-prosocial norm, the effect of eyes on 
donation was not significant (b = -0.05, OR = 0.95, p = .917). On the other hand, when 
there was a prosocial norm, the effect of eyes was significantly positive (b = 1.23, OR = 
3.42, p = .006).  
 
We also conducted an ordinal logistic regression analysis utilizing perception of 
the donations of others as an independent variable (11 points scale; 1 = 0 JPY, 11 = 500 
JPY), instead of the dummy variable of the norm condition. Again, we found a significant 
interaction effect (b = 0.26, OR = 1.30, p = .024) between eyes and norms such that when 
individuals thought others donated relatively less, the effect of the watching eyes on their 
donations was not significant (b = -0.22, OR = 0.80, p = .650). On the other hand, when 
they thought others donated relatively more, this effect was significantly positive (b = 
1.29, OR = 3.65, p = .005). 
 
Next, we conducted a logistic regression analysis for the dependent variable that 
reflected whether something (1) or nothing (0) was donated. The independent variable 
was the same as in the previous ordinal logistic model. As a result, there were no 
significant main effects of sex (b = 0.30, OR = 1.35, p = .403), eyes (b = 0.40, OR = 1.50, 
p = 0.255), or norms (b = -0.06, OR = 0.94, p = 0.870). However, the interaction between 
eyes and norms was marginally non-significant (b = 1.26, OR = 3.54, p = .078). A simple 
slope analysis showed that when there was a non-prosocial norm, the effect of eyes on 
donation was not significant (b = -0.25, OR = 0.78, p = .628). On the other hand, when 
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there was a prosocial norm, the effect of eyes was significantly positive (b = 1.02, OR = 
2.76, p = .043). These results were replicated when we used the perception of norm as an 
independent variable, instead of norm condition. The interaction between eyes and norms 
was marginally non-significant (b = 0.22, OR = 1.25, p = .086). A simple slope analysis 
showed that when there was a non-prosocial norm, the effect of watching eyes on 
donations was not significant (b = -0.23, OR = 0.79, p = .641). On the other hand, when 
there was a prosocial norm, this effect was marginally non-significant (b = 1.08, OR = 
2.95, p = .054). 
 
2.3.  Discussion 
 To investigate the mechanism involved in the watching eyes effect, the present 
study investigated whether it is influenced by prosocial norms. The results showed that 
the watching eyes promoted donations only when others behaved generously; that is, 
when a prosocial norm existed. In line with some previous arguments (e.g., Nettle et al., 
2013), these results support the avoiding a bad reputation hypothesis. When a prosocial 
norm exists, not behaving generously leads to a bad reputation as a norm violator. To 
avoid such a risk, when participants are “watched” by the eye-like images, they conform 
to the prosocial norm. On the other hand, when there is a non-prosocial norm, it is unlikely 
that a non-prosocial person will be punished by an observer. In this case, it is already 
understood that eyes will have no effect on prosocial behaviors. 
 
 Two previous studies also investigated the watching eyes effect by manipulating 
norm information (Bateson et al., 2013; Fathi et al., 2014). In particular, Fathi et al. (2014) 
conducted a donation experiment in a laboratory as was the case with our study. However, 
their results did not support the avoiding a bad reputation hypothesis. One difference 
between ours and Fathi et al.’s (2014) study is the strength of the norm manipulation. 
Fathi et al. (2014) manipulated norms by changing the types of dominant coins in the 
charity donation jar. In contrast, we explicitly showed an average donation amount 
received from the previous eight participants. We considered this to function as a clear 
normative point. In fact, unlike Fathi et al. (2014), we were able to test the effectiveness 
of our norm manipulation, and found that the manipulation was successful. It was easy 
for the participants to recognize what the normative behaviors and norm violations were. 
Therefore, the participants could expect a bad reputation for non-normative behavior 
performed in front of the eye-like images. 
 
 Some studies have suggested that the watching eyes effect is mediated by the 
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concern for obtaining a good reputation, rather than the concern for avoiding a bad 
reputation (e.g., Oda et al., 2011; Powell et al., 2012). Particularly, Oda et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that eyes activated the expectation of a future reward. This, in turn, 
promoted monetary distributions to others. To consider the apparent contradiction 
between the results of Oda et al.’s (2011) study and ours, we focus on the differences in 
the experimental settings of these studies. Unlike the previous study, we showed norm 
information to participants in both the prosocial and non-prosocial norm conditions. This 
norm information may have activated the concern for avoiding a bad reputation as a norm 
violator. This, in turn, may have led to promotion of prosocial behavior only in the 
presence of a prosocial norm. On the other hand, as Oda et al. (2011) demonstrated, if 
normative cues do not exist, the concern for obtaining a good reputation may promote 
prosocial behavior in front of watching eyes. 
 
 Although some previous studies have suggested that eyes increase the numbers 
of donations obtained (e. g., Nettle et al., 2013), we found relatively weak results when 
we investigated whether the eyes and norms affected the dependent variable that reflected 
whether something or nothing was donated. We believe this was due to our manipulation 
of norms. In line with Nook et al. (2016), we showed average donation amounts in relation 
to social norms. Unlike the donor ratio (e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004), the average donation 
amount tells how much people donated on average, but it cannot tell how many people 
actually donated. In particular, the 38 JPY that we portrayed as the average donation from 
the previous eight participants in the non-prosocial norm condition could be interpreted 
as representing how many people donated nothing, with most of the contributions coming 
through the high donation amounts of a few, or how many people donated small amounts 
of money. Thus, in our experiment, we demonstrated how watching eyes affected the 
decision of how much, rather than whether, to donate. 
 
 In the original study, we found clear results that support our hypothesis. On the 
other hand, some studies did not find that the watching eyes effect occurs only when a 
prosocial norm exists (Bateson et al., 2013; Fathi et al., 2014). Given that the results of 
previous studies are mixed, it will be premature to draw a conclusion from a single 
experiment. Hence, we conducted a replication study.  
 
Before conducting the experiment, we pre-registered the procedure and our 
hypothesis on the Open Science Framework. To generalize the results, we changed the 
environment, dependent variable, and participants in the replication study. However, we 
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retained the main manipulation of the original study; we manipulated the norms and eyes 
in the same way as in the original study. We investigated whether watching eyes promoted 
generosity only when prosocial norms existed. 
 
3.  Replication Study 
 In the next study, we tried to replicate the original study. We pre-registered the 
nature of the effect, the study design, the differences between the original and the 
replication study, and the analysis plan on the Open Science Framework (OSF). The 
registration is available on the OSF site (https://osf.io/wknd6/). 
 
 The replication study differed from the original study in three points. First, 
although we conducted the original study in a lab, we conducted the replication study 
online. Considering that some previous studies involved web-based experiments about 
the watching eyes effect (e.g., Komiya et al., 2016; Pfattheicher and Keller, 2015), an 
online experiment is not inappropriate for this setting. Second, the participants’ ages were 
between 20 and 60. Third, instead of donating money, participants volunteered their effort 
for charity. We referred to previous studies that used effortful tasks to estimate generosity 
(Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009; Coleman and Williams, 2013; Imas, 2014).  
 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1. Participants and design 
 Four hundred Japanese crowdsourcing workers aged 20-60 years (M = 38.5, SD 
= 9.40; 182 males and 218 females), recruited from Crowdworks (a crowdsourcing 
service in Japan), were paid 300 JPY to participate. They were randomly allocated to one 
condition of a 2 (eyes: eyes vs. no eyes) × 2 (norm: prosocial vs. non-prosocial) between-
participants design: (a) prosocial norm with eyes (n = 100), (b) prosocial norm without 
eyes (n = 100), (c) non-prosocial norm with eyes (n = 99), and (d) non-prosocial norm 
without eyes (n = 101). The participant sex ratio was almost equal throughout all 
conditions. The sample size was decided following the guidelines of Simonsohn (2015); 
Simonsohn (2015) suggested that the sample size of a replication study should be at least 
2.5 times the size of the original sample. This study was approved by the ethics committee 
at the Graduate School of Education of Kyoto University, and consent was obtained from 
all participants before the experiment was conducted. 
 
3.1.2 Procedure 
The survey page was made by Qualtrics online survey software 
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(http://www.qualtrics.com/). The survey can be answered only by PC. The background of 
the page featured the eye-like images that were the same as in the original study. The 
question area covered the eyes in the beginning so participants could not see the images. 
To control the experimental settings, only participants who reported that they were in a 
room alone could answer the questionnaire. Additionally, we asked participants to 
maximize the survey page before starting the survey. 
 
Before working for charity, participants worked for themselves. Participants 
worked on a task that required typing a handwritten string of 8 digits from 1 to 8 randomly 
in a line (e.g., 14,265,873). There was a total of 25 strings. They were explained that a 
fee of 100JPY (out of a total fee of 300 JPY for the whole experiment) was the reward for 
this task. That is, they would get 4 JPY per string entered. All of them entered the 25 
strings. This effortful task for themselves was conducted to link the task contents and 
reward. 
 
Then, participants were asked to do the same effortful task. They were informed 
that in the next task, they could not obtain their own reward but in return they could donate 
money to the Japanese Red Cross Society. They were also informed that they could decide 
how many numbers they would enter by themselves (0-50 strings; 4JPY donated to 
Japanese Red Cross Society per string).  
 
As in the original study, participants saw an amount of work that ostensibly 
represented the mean quantity of the previous eight participants’ work (43 strings: 
prosocial norm or 3 strings: non-prosocial norm). At the same time, the eyes were 
manipulated. Only in the eyes condition, the question area became translucent to reveal 
the eye-like images (Fig 3A; larger images are uploaded on https://osf.io/pvksd/). In the 
no eyes condition, the question area covered the eyes (Fig 3B). 
 
They first entered their amount of work on the PC using the slider. Then, they 
actually performed the effortful task for charity. After they finished the effortful task, 
participants responded to questions concerning how much they thought the other 
participants had donated on average (0 to 50 strings; in units of 5 strings) and were tested 
on their knowledge about how much money would be donated to charity if they entered 
one string (1: 4 JPY, 2: 400 JPY, 3: 800JPY). Additionally, they answered some questions 
about the environment such as how wide their room was, the presence of a poster with a 
human face in front of them, how many people were in their room during their answers. 
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Lastly, they were debriefed. 
 
3.2.  Results 
 Nine of the 400 participants answered a manipulation check question incorrectly; 
they did not recognize how much money would be donated to charity correctly. Data from 
these participants were excluded from the following analyses. 
 
 The norm manipulation was successful; participants in the prosocial norm 
condition thought that the other participants donated more than did those in the non-
prosocial norm condition (Mprosocial = 34.09, SDprosocial = 11.39, Mnon-prosocial = 12.76, SDnon-
prosocial = 10.62; t (387.82) = 19.16, p < .001, d = 1.94).  
 
Across conditions, 380 of the 391 participants worked for charity at least once. 
Because almost all participants worked for charity at least once, we did not conduct a 
logistic regression analysis for the dependent variable that reflected whether something 
(1) or nothing (0) was donated. The mean amount was 26.87 times (SD = 18.71) out of 
50 times. Fig. 4 shows the boxplot of the work amount for each condition.  
 
 As in the original study, we divided the work amount into six categories (0: 0, 
1: 1-10, 2: 11-20, 3: 21-30, 4: 31-40, 5: 41-50). On further analysis, we used this 
categorical variable as the indicator of the work amount. We conducted proportional 
odds ordinal logistic regression analyses for the amount (Table 2). As shown in Table 2, 
we found a significant effect of norm condition. However, we did not find a significant 
main effect of eyes or an interaction effect. The results of simple slope analyses showed 
that the effect of eyes was not significant regardless of norm condition (prosocial norm: 
b = 0.05, OR = 1.05, p = 0.853; non-prosocial norm: b = -0.04, OR = 0.96, p = 0.867).  
 
We next conducted an ordinal logistic regression analysis utilizing perception of 
the donations of others as an independent variable, instead of the dummy variable of the 
norm condition. Again, we did not find a significant interaction effect (b = 0.07, OR = 
1.08, p = .324) between eyes and norms. The coefficient of eyes did not change whether 
participants perceived a relatively prosocial norm (b = 0.39, OR = 1.48, p = .232) or a 
non-prosocial norm (b = -0.06, OR = 0.94, p = .844). 
 
To investigate why the replication study did not replicate the original, we also 
conducted further analyses. Because we did not register these analyses in advance, we 
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should be careful in interpreting the statistical significance tests. Nonetheless, we 
consider that exploratory analyses are informative for future research. 
 
One possible reason is that we could not control the levels of anonymity in the 
online experiment. We excluded participants who reported that there were pictures or 
posters that have faces or that there were people around them during their answer (n = 
28). We conducted ordinal logistic analysis the same as in the above analyses. When we 
used the dummy variable of the norm condition, the interaction effect of eyes and norms 
was b = 0.14 (OR = 1.15, p = .731). When we used perception of the donations of others, 
the interaction effect of eyes and norms was b = 0.09 (OR = 1.10, p = .231).  
 
3.3. Discussion 
In the replication study, we tried to replicate the original study. Although we 
manipulated eyes and norms in accordance with the original study, the results of the 
replication study were not consistent with the original results; the eyes did not promote 
generosity regardless of whether a prosocial norm existed or not.  
 
To generalize the results, we modified the dependent variable from the original 
study; participants conducted an effortful task for charity, instead of donating money 
directly. This may have caused the difference in the results. As figs 2 and 4 show, the 
distribution of the replication study was different from that of the original study. In the 
replication study, the full distribution increased and almost all people made an effort for 
charity at least once regardless of conditions. More importantly, in the replication study, 
it seems more appropriate to say that participants followed the norm where there were no 
eyes, rather than violating the norm under the eyes. We compared the simple slopes of the 
norm on the dependent variable (donation or work amount) per eyes conditions. In the 
eyes condition, the effect of the norm condition on the dependent variable was not 
different between the original study (b = 1.33, OR = 3.80, p = .004) and the replication 
study (b = 1.46, OR = 4.30, p < .001). On the other hand, in the no eyes condition, the 
effect of norm was only significant in the replication study (original study: b = 0.05, OR 
= 1.06, p = .905; replication study: b = 1.36, OR = 3.91, p < .001). That is, in the 
replication study, participants followed the prosocial norm regardless of the presence of 
watching eyes. One explanation of this difference is that the incentive to deviate from the 
prosocial norm was smaller in the replication study than in the original study. While 
people who violated the prosocial norm could keep their money in the original study, 
violators only saved their effort in the replication study. If the benefits from deviating 
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from the prosocial norm are small, people may be likely to comply with prosocial norms 
regardless of the presence of watching eyes. Hence, in the replication study, people are 
likely to follow the norm even when there are no eyes. 
 
We also modified the location of the experiment; while the original study was 
conducted in a laboratory, the replication study was online. This could also have 
influenced the results. Previous studies suggested that the number of people in an area 
can moderate the watching eyes effect (e.g., Bateson et al., 2013; Ernest-Jones et al., 
2011). Although we have controlled the influence of people or pictures around 
participants, we could have failed to control other confounding factors that affect the level 
of anonymity.  
 
Anyway, we did not replicate the results of the original study. In the general 
discussion, we comprehensively interpret and discuss the results of the original and 
replication studies. 
 
4. General Discussion 
Although many researchers have studied the watching eyes effect, the existence 
of the effect is still being discussed. Some findings have found watching eyes promotes 
generosity (e.g., Haley and Fessler, 2005; Oda et al., 2011), while others have not found 
such results (e.g., Matsugasaki et al., 2015; Raihani and Bshary, 2012; Tane and Takezawa, 
2011). A recent meta-analysis showed that the watching eyes effect did not occur when 
moderation factors were not considered (Northover et al., 2017). To investigate when and 
why the watching eyes promote generosity, we manipulated both the presence of eyes and 
the social norm.  
 
 Across two studies, we investigated whether the eyes effect occurred only when 
a prosocial norm was present. In the original study, we found that eyes promote generosity 
only when a prosocial norm was present. These results support the avoiding a bad 
reputation hypothesis. On the other hand, in the replication study, we found that eyes did 
not promote generosity regardless of the norm. 
 
 How should we interpret the contradiction in these results? One possible 
interpretation is that the results of the original study were a false positive. Not only the 
results of our replication study, but the results of other studies that investigated the 
moderation effect of norms were also different from our original study (Bateson et al., 
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2013; Fathi et al., 2014). Further, recently, Oda and Ichihashi (2016) also investigated 
whether the watching eyes effect differs depending on norms and they reported different 
conclusions about the moderation effect of norms from our original study. Considering 
the existence of these studies, we cannot deny the possibility that the significant results 
of the original study were found by chance. 
 
 The other possibility is that there are other moderators, such as the incentive of 
norm-violation. As discussed above, if the incentive of norm-violation is low, people may 
be likely to follow norm even when the eyes are not shown. Additionally, we do not think 
that we can explain all of the previous studies that did not find a watching eyes effect 
moderated by the effect of norms. There could be other moderators, such as the number 
of people in an area (c.f., Ernest-Jones et al., 2011). In future studies, we should consider 
the existence of further moderation factors. 
 
 To investigate whether the watching eyes effect depends on social norms in the 
future, it is also necessary to consider cultural differences. Gelfand et al. (2011) suggested 
that there is cultural variation in the strength of social norms. As Table 1 of Gelfand et al. 
(2011) shows, Japan has relatively strong norms and low tolerance of deviant behavior. 
Therefore, it is possible to believe Japanese participants were sensitive to the norm 
information. We do not think that cultural differences can explain the contradiction of our 
studies because the two studies were conducted in the same culture. However, future 
studies are needed to investigate whether the watching eyes effect is moderated by norms 
in other cultures. 
 
 Since we did not replicate the results of the first study, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the mechanism of the eyes effect and the influence of norms. The 
moderation effect of norms can occur, but it does not always. Recently, the watching eyes 
effect has been drawing attention and some researchers have focused on whether the 
watching eyes promotes generosity only when a prosocial norm exists (Bateson et al., 
2013; Fathi et al., 2014; Oda and Ichihashi, 2016). Since this is now actively discussed 
by many researchers, we consider that null results are as important as positive ones. 
Although we did not replicate the results of our first study, we conducted the replication 
study after registering the hypothesis and methods. In the future, it is necessary to draw 
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Fig. 1. Participant view of the original study. Fig 1A represents the screen before the 
donation phase. Fig 1B represents the screen in the eyes condition during the donation 






Fig. 2: Boxplot of the donation amount for each condition in the original study. Each dot 






Fig. 3. Participant view of the replication study. Fig 3A represents the screen in the eyes 
condition during the donation phase. Fig 3B represents the screen in the no eyes 





Fig. 4: Boxplot of the work amount for each condition in the replication study. Each dot 






Table 1. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Donation Amounts (N = 133): Original Study 1 
 
 
Intercept: 1 (Y>=2) 
Intercept: 2 (Y>=3) 
Intercept: 3 (Y>=4) 
Intercept: 4 (Y>=5) 
Intercept: 5 (Y>=6) 
Sex (M: -0.43, F: 0.57)b 
Eyes (No eyes: -0.50, Eyes: 0.50) 
Norm (non-prosocial: -0.52, prosocial: 0.48) 



















































































































































a odds ratio 2 
b Every dummy variable was centered 3 
  4 
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Table 2. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Work Amount (N = 391): Replication Study 5 
 
 
Intercept: 1 (Y>=2) 
Intercept: 2 (Y>=3) 
Intercept: 3 (Y>=4) 
Intercept: 4 (Y>=5) 
Intercept: 5 (Y>=6) 
Sex (M: -0.54, F: 0.46)b 
Age 
Eyes (No eyes: -0.50, Eyes: 0.50) 
Norm (non-prosocial: -0.50, prosocial: 0.50) 





























































































































































a odds ratio 6 
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